Handout for Meeting 8


The Metaphysics of Normativity and the Social Dimension of Discursive Practice

Outline:

Recap.

- I. The Social Metaphysics of Normativity: Attitudes and Statuses
- II. Propositional Attitude Ascriptions:
- Making Normative Attitudes Explicit in an Extension of the Base Vocabulary
- III. De Re Ascriptions and Representational Uptake

I. <u>The Social Metaphysics of Normativity: Attitudes and Statuses</u>




- JTB. Two Approaches:
 - 1. Knowledge is justified true belief that p
 - 2. What one is *doing* in *taking* someone S to know that *p* is:
 - i) *Attributing* to S doxastic *commitment* to *p*, (B)
 - ii) *Attributing* to S *entitlement* to that commitment to *p*, (J)
 - iii) *Acknowledging* oneself *commitment* to that claimable *p*, (T).


Q: What are the relations between normative attitudes and normative statuses?

Hegel distinguishes between two approaches to their conceptual-explanatory priority: *Traditional*: the status-dependence of normative attitudes. (Status-first approach.) *Modern*: the attitude-dependence of normative statuses. (Attitude-first approach.)

Autonomy: The Basic Kantian Normative Status



The Social Dimension of the Kantian Autonomy Model



(and Responsibility) Subject of Normative Attitudes and Statuses Attitudes Constitutive of Statuses, if Suitably Complemented Attributing Attributing

Robust General Recognition is Attributing the Authority to Attribute Authority

"They recognize themselves as mutually recognizing one another." [Hegel: PhG 184].

II.Propositional Attitude Ascriptions:Making Normative Attitudes Explicit in an Extension of the Base Vocabulary

The *de dicto / de re* distinction for tense:

- 1. The President of the United States will be a woman by January 21, 2025.
- 2. Joe Biden is the President of the United States.

so

3. Joe Biden will be a woman by January 21, 2025.

The inference reads (1) as about a particular person (*res*, or thing), namely Joe Biden, and tracks that person/thing (*res*) through time.

The sense in which (1) is true, though, is *de dicto*: the *dictum* (saying, proposition) "The President of the United States is a woman," *will be true* on January 21, 2025. It is that *dictum* that is followed through time, rather than the *res*.

An *ascription* of propositional attitude expresses the practical attitude of *attributing* a doxastic commitment, by making an assertion: "S believes (is doxastically committed to accept) *p*."

In ascribing, one is accordingly doing *two* things: *attributing* one doxastic commitment and *acknowledging* another. So there can be an issue about what part of the utterance is doing what job: expressing the commitment *acknowledged* or the commitment *attributed*.

- 4. Henry Adams believed the inventor of the lightning rod did not invent the lightning rod.
- 5. * Henry Adams believed **that** the inventor of the lightning rod did not invent the lightning rod. (*De dicto*)

- 6. Henry Adams believed **of** the inventor of the lightning rod **that** he did not invent the lightning rod. (*De re*)
- 7. Henry Adams believed **that** the inventor of bifocals did not invent the lightning rod.

In specifying the content of the claim that is attributed by an ascription, a question can arise as to who the ascriber takes to be responsible for this being a way of *saying* (that is, making explicit) what is believed, the content of the commitment. Consider the sly prosecutor, who characterizes his opponent's claim by saying:

8. The defense attorney believes a pathological liar is a trustworthy witness.

We can imagine that the defense attorney hotly contests this characterization:

9. Not so; what I believe is that the man who just testified is a trustworthy witness. To which the prosecutor might reply:

10. Exactly, and I have presented evidence that ought to convince anyone that the man who just testified is a pathological liar.

What the prosecutor *ought* to say (matters of courtroom strategy aside) is:

11. The defense attorney claims of a pathological liar that he is a trustworthy witness.

Suppose that according to *A*'s scorekeeping on commitments, *S* acknowledges commitment to the claim $\Phi(t)$. Then *A* can make this attribution of commitment explicit in the form of a claim:

12. A: S claims that $\Phi(t)$.

If in addition A acknowledges commitment to the identity

13. A: t=t',

then whether or not A takes it that S would acknowledge that commitment, A can also characterize the content of the commitment ascribed to S by saying, de re

14. A: S claims of t' that $\Phi(it)$.

The converse of *de re* ascriptions is ^s scare quotes^s.

Suppose a politician says:

15. S: The patriotic freedom fighters liberated the village.

disagreeing with the characterization, but wanting to stipulate that she is referring to the same folks, his opponent might respond, *attributing* the substitutional commitment:

16. A: Those ^s patriotic freedom fighters^s massacred the entire population.

III. De Re Ascriptions and Representational Uptake

Claim: The principal locus and home language-game in ordinary language of the locutions by which we distinguish what we are talking or thinking *about*, rather than what we are saying or thinking, is the 'of' or 'about' that marks off *de re* portions of propositional-attitude ascriptions. This vocabulary expresses the distinction of **social perspective** between commitments *attributed* and those *acknowledged*, and *thereby* the *representational* dimension of discursive content.